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Abstract
Biometrics such as fingerprint, iris, face, and electrocardiogram (ECG) have been
investigated as convenient and powerful security tools that can potentially replace
or supplement current possession or knowledge based authentication schemes. Re-
cently, multi-spectral skin photomatrix (MSP) has been newly found as one of the
biometrics. Moreover, since the interest of usage and security for wearable devices
have been increasing, multi-modal biometrics authentication which is combining
more than two modalities such as (iris + face) or (iris + fingerprint) for powerful
and convenience authentication is widely proposed.
However, one practical drawback of biometrics is irrevocability. Unlike password,
biometrics can not be canceled and re-used once compromised since they are not
changed forever. There have been several works on cancelable biometrics to overcome
this drawback. ECG has been investigated as a promising biometrics, but there are
few research on cancelable ECG biometrics.
As we aim to study a way for multi-modal biometric scheme for wearable devices
that is assumed circumstance under some limitations such as relatively high perfor-
mance, low computing power, and limited information (not sharing users information
to the public), in this study, we proposed a multi-modal biometrics authentication
by combining ECG and MSP. For investigating the performances versus level of
fusions, Adaboost algorithm was studied as a score level fusion method, and Ma-
jority Voting was studied as a decision level fusion method. Due to ECG signal is 1
dimensional, it provides benefits in wearable devices for overcoming the computing
memory limitation. The reasons that we select MSP combination with ECG are it
can be collected by measuring on inner-wrist of human body and it also can be
considered as hardly stolen modality in remote ways.
For proposed multi-modal biometrics, We evaluate our methods using collected
data by Brain-Computer-Interface lab with 63 subjects. Our Adaboost based pro-
posed multi modal biometrics method with performance boost yielded 99.7% de-
tection probability at 0.1% false alarm ratio (PD0.1) and 0.3% equal error rate
(EER), which are far better than simply combining by Majority Voting algorithm
with 21.5% PD0.1 and 1.6% EER. Note that for training the Adaboost algorithm,
we used only 9 people dataset which is assumed as public data and not included for
testing data set, against for knowledge limitation as the other constraint.
As initial step for user template protection, We proposed a cancelable ECG based
user authentication using a composite hypothesis testing in compressive sensing do-
main by deriving a generalized likelihood ratio test (GLRT) detector. We also pro-
posed two performance boost tricks in compressive sensing domain to compensate
for performance degradation due to cancelable schemes: user template guided filter-
ing and T-wave shift model based GLRT detector for random projection domain. To
verify our proposed method, we investigated cancelable biometrics criteria for the
proposed methods to confirm that the proposed algorithms are indeed cancelable.
For proposed cancelable ECG authentication, We evaluated our proposed methods
using ECG data with 147 subjects from three public ECG data sets (ECG-ID, MIT-
BIH Normal / Arrhythmia). Our proposed cancelable ECG authentication method
is practically cancelable by satisfying all cancelable biometrics criteria. Moreover,
our proposed method with performance boost tricks achieved 97.1% detection prob-
ability at 1% false alarm ratio (PD1) and 1.9% equal error rate (EER), which are
even better than non-cancelable baseline with 94.4% PD1 and 3.1% EER for single
pulse ECG authentication.
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CHAPTER I
Introduction
1.1 Aim of the Research
The aim of this research is to investigate a way of using biometrics as alternative of knowledge
based authentication methods for computationally constrained and data limited circumstance
such as wearable devices. The detail aims of the study are (1) to investigate a combining methods
of uni-modal biometrics (in this study we used electrocardiogram (ECG) and multi-spectral skin
photomatrix (MSP)) for multi-modal biometrics authentication, (2) to overcome the practical
drawback of biometrics by investigating of user template protection methods which is called as
cancelable biometrics, and (3) to compensate the performance degradation which is commonly
observed by protecting user templates, we finally studied the ways of performance boosting
while practically keeping the cancelability of authentication system.
1.2 Biometrics Authentication
Biometrics such as fingerprint, face, and iris provide convenient and powerful security tools
to verify or identify individuals. A biometric system is essentially a pattern recognition system
that operates by acquiring biometric data from an individual, extracting a set of features from
the acquired data, and comparing this feature set to the enrolled feature set [3].
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Figure 1.1: Examples of biometric characteristics: (a) face, (b) fingerprint, (c) hand geometry,
(d) iris, (e) keystroke, (f) signature, and (g) voice [1]
Fingerprint recognition has been widely used in smart phone authentication, computer login,
and access control system for buildings. Face recognition and iris based user verification are
often used in modern electronic devices. Biometrics are now combined with electronic passport
for border control systems in many countries [4]. Combining more than one biometrics as a
multimodal biometrics has been widely investigated for strong security [5, 6]. A comprehensive
review on recent biometrics research can be found in [7].
1.3 Contribution of This Thesis
In this study, We investigate the potential of MSP which is recently proposed, as biometrics
material for wearable devices. And also, by performing various simulations for observation of the
modality combination e↵ect, we propose an Adaboost algorithm for multi-modal authentication
method for ECG and MSP with 63 subjects provided by BCI labs. Since ECG is 1-dimensional
signal, and by vectorizing the feature of MSP that may simultaneously measured with ECG,
it against the low computing power that is one of constraint on wearable devices. We tried to
overcome the limitation, due to wearable device implementation, for every proposed methods
in this study.
Furthermore, we propose a cancelable ECG biometrics by deriving a near-optimal general-
ized likelihood ratio test (GLRT) detector from a composite hypothesis testing in compressed
sensing (CS) domain. The CS theory was about recovering the original signal from undersam-
pled data [8] when enough samples are acquired. Recently, CS was applied to conventional
statistical signal processing tools such as detection and filtering [9,10]. One of the results in [10]
showed that statistical signal processing tools in CS domain is more e cient than using CS re-
covery and signal processing tools separately in terms of sampling size. Therefore, we conjecture
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that our new GLRT detector in CS domain is e cient, but not recoverable with appropriately
small sample size. Our proposed GLRT method was investigated to see if it satisfied cancelable
biometrics criteria (e ciency, re-usability, diversity and non-invertibility) [11]. To the authors’
knowledge, this article is the first work of combining CS theory with ECG biometrics for can-
celable ECG biometrics with near-optimal metric and of evaluating the proposed method for
cancelable biometrics criteria. Fira et al. proposed to use a random matrix of normal distribu-
tion for ECG signals using CS theory, but their work focused on e cient data compression for
di↵erent pathological classes [12].
For performance degradation due to cancelable biometrics scheme, we also propose to use
two performance improvement tricks called user template guided filtering [13] and T-wave circu-
lar shift model [14] that were shown to be e↵ective in performance boosting in ECG biometrics.
For user template guided filtering, it is required to store an original user template informa-
tion [13], but in cancelable ECG biometrics, it should not be stored. In this article, we propose
an irreversible guide signal construction method to resolve this conflict so that user template
guided filtering can be used for detectors in CS domain. For T-wave shift model, we also propose
an e cient algorithm to use T-wave shift model in CS domain.
Part of the works here was presented at the 2017 IEEE EMBC [15]. Its extended version was
submitted to IEEE T-IFS including more detailed descriptions, more ECG data to all simula-
tions (MIT-BIH Normal / Arrhythmia data sets [16,17] were added to ECG-ID [18] with signal
normalization additionally), investigating cancelable biometrics criteria with more simulation
results, and proposing a new T-wave shift method is CS domain (related to Chapter III). For
the other part related to Chapter II of the works here is in preparation for submission to IEEE
T-IFS. We are going to propose an Adaboost based multimodal authentication method with
combination of ECG and MSP with 63 subjects while overcoming the circumstance limitation
in wearable devices.
1.4 Organization of This Thesis
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II describes some works on authentication
method for uni-modal each, and its combination e↵ect, and proposes a Adaboost algorithm
for multi-modal authentication by using ECG and MSP. Chapter III reviews some previous
works on cancelable biometrics, and proposes a cancelable ECG biometrics by deriving the gen-
eralized likelihood ratio test (GLRT) in compressed sensing (CS) domain with two performance
boost tricks. Finally, in chapter IV concludes this thesis with a summary and future works.
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CHAPTER II
Multimodal Biometrics Authentication by
Combining ECG and MSP
2.1 Background and Related Works
2.1.1 Electrocardiogram as Biometrics
Electrocardiogram (ECG) has been investigated as a promising biometrics for authentica-
tion, identification and liveness validation [19–21]. One pulse of an ECG signal consists of P
wave, QRS complex, and T wave (in Figure.2.1) that are from atrial depolarization, ventricular
depolarization, and ventricular repolarization, respectively [22]. These characteristics depend
on the structure and biological substrate of a heart which are known to be di↵erent on each
person [23].
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Figure 2.1: Electrocardiogram (ECG) signal, consists of P wave, QRS complex, and T wave
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There have been many works on ECG biometrics since early 2000’s. Biel et al. was one
of the first works on ECG biometrics using fiducial features such as amplitude, duration, and
deflection of QRS complex [24]. Since then, fiducial and non-fiducial features of ECG have
been investigated for biometrics such as using durations / intervals of ECG waves [25], using
intervals, amplitude and angles [26], autocorrelation and discrete cosine transform [27] and
wavelet transform [28]. Various classification / authentication algorithms have also been applied
for ECG biometrics such as decision based neural network [29], linear discriminant analysis
(LDA) with PCA [18], dynamic time warping (DTW) and Fisher’s LDA [30], various distance
metrics such as DTW, earth mover’s distance, Frechet distance and Hausdor↵ distance [31] and
Euclidean distance variants [20,32,33]. For more comprehensive reviews on ECG biometrics, we
refer readers to [34, 35].
It is worth noting that recent works on ECG biometrics have made significant progresses
so that ECG biometrics can be potentially used in various daily activities through wearable
ECG sensors and devices. Wearable ECG sensors have been investigated for long-term health
monitoring [36, 37]. There have been recent works on ECG biometrics for wearable devices in
terms of wearable ECG band development [38], low power circuit design [39], and light-weight
authentication algorithm [40]. ECG has also been investigated as part of multimodal biometrics
systems with fingerprint / face [41], voice [42] or palmprint [43]. ECG has a great potential as
a biometrics.
2.1.2 ECG signal modeling and authentication
The acquired ECG signal f 0 can be modeled as:
f 0 = x+ n+ r + p (II.1)
where x is an original ECG signal (length K), n is high frequency noise, r is baseline drift and p
is power-line noise. Usually, preprocessing of f 0 can reduce unwanted noise or artifacts. Slowly
varying baseline drift r can be corrected by high-pass filtering or wavelet based drift correction.
Power-line noise p is on specific frequency such as 50Hz or 60 Hz it can be reduced by bandstop
filters (see [44] for details). High frequency noise n can be reduced by low-pass filtering, but this
filtering could also remove some high frequency details of x. Thus, low-pass filtering should be
used with care to preserve details, while to reduce noise. Here we assume that low-pass filtering
is not applied. Then, the pre-processed ECG signal f can be modeled as:
f ⇡ x+ n. (II.2)
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2.1.3 Multi-spectral Skin Photomatrix
The multi-spectral skin photomatrix (MSP) is recently investigated as a biometrics [2].
According to this research, due to optical patterns of their inner-wrist skin tissue is unique, it can
be used as potential identification tools. For MSP data acquisition, optical patterns are measured
by 2⇥ 8 photodiode channel with selective wavelength (called IR and Yellow) which is positioned
on the inner-wrist skin. Despite it is initial study as biometrics, they achieve moderately high
performance (FAR 0.3% and FRR 0%) with 21 subjects by using linear discriminant analysis
(LDA) for IR + Yellow feature case.
Figure 2.2: Anatomical structure of human skin with penetration depths of light [2].
2.1.4 Distance Measurements
The conventional user authentication is done by measuring the distance between enrolled
template signals f1, . . . , fN and current input signals s1, . . . , sM as follows:
d({f1, . . . , fN}, {s1, . . . , sM})
reject
?
accept
  (II.3)
where d is a distance metric or classifier and   is a threshold. Especially in case of ECG user
authentication, It has been shown that this can yield better performance with more ECG signals
(or larger N , M) [34].
One of the conventional user authentication methods for limited memory and computation
power is to use a single user template t and a single biometrics feature s such that t =
PN
i=1 fi/N
6
and s = s1 with a simple Euclidean distance as follows:
d(t, s) =
vuut KX
j=1
(t[j]  s[j])2
reject
?
accept
 0 (II.4)
where  0 is a threshold. It has been shown that this simple detector is actually a generalized
likelihood ratio test (GLRT) detector if n follows an independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) Gaussian noise [14]. This method has been demonstrated to be e↵ective for user au-
thentication when proper performance improvement methods with mild computation increases
are used together [13, 14]. As we described in section. 2.1.1, there are various studies for signal
similarity or distance measuring not only for using Euclidean distance.
2.1.5 Fusion Methods
According to the Sarhan et al, There are four standard fusion types including feature level
fusion, score level fusion, decision level fusion, and sensor level fusion. Comparative performance
evaluation is here [6].
Figure 2.3: Types of fusion level: Feature, Score, and Decision.
In this study, we concentrated on two methods: Majority Voting (Algorithm 1 [45,46]), and
Adaboost (Algorithm 2 [47]) which are two di↵erent methods of decision level fusion. Majority
Voting method can be simply described that acceptance is decided when the sum of every
voting is over half of number of classifiers by assuming every uni-modal decision as one voting.
Adaboost algorithm can be explained as finding appropriate coe cients between weak classifiers
by updating the observation weight based on classification error. Shortly, MV means all sum of
decision without any weighting while the Adaboost method implies the weighted sum of each
classifiers. Since decision level fusion is relatively simple to implement when the device already
store the classifiers, we choose that decision level fusion may be more suitable for multimodal
biometrics on wearable devices than other fusion on di↵erent stages. Comprehensive information
of other methods for decision level fusion is here [48].
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Algorithm 1 Majority voting [45,46]
1: For the given threshold, th and number of classifier, M .
G(x) =
MX
i=1
gm(x) > bM/2c
where x is input score, and the classifier,
gm(x) =
8><>:1, x > th0, x < th
Algorithm 2 Adaboost.M1 for multi-modal biometrics [47]
1: Initialize the observation weight
2: wi = 1/N , i = 1, 2, ...,N . and yi 2 [ 1, 1].
3: for m = 1 to M do
4: Thresholding the distances with given threshold, th.
5:
fm(xi) =
(
1, xi > th
 1, xi < th
6: Compute an error.
errm =
PN
i=1wiI(yi 6= fm(xi))PN
i=1wi
where I(·) is an indicator function.
7: Compute weight, ↵ for individual classifier
8:
↵m = log((1  errm)/errm)
9: Update the weights
10:
wi  wi · exp[↵m · I(yi 6= fm(xi))], 8i
11: Weight normalization such that
NX
i=1
wi = 1
12: end for
13: Final Decision,
F (x) = sign[
MX
m=1
↵mfm(x)]
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2.2 Simulation Settings
2.2.1 Data Pre-processing
In this experience, we divided a measured ECG and MSP data set into 6 records regarding
3 pulses and 3 feature respectively. For the measured few-minute ECG records per one subject,
to segment into single pulses with regarding to R-peak, Pan-Tompkins method for R-peak
detection was applied [49] after base-line correction by band-pass filtering. Due to its sampling
rate is 250 Hz, single pulse, which cover P-QRS-T fragment, can be acheived by cut with length
160 samples or 0.64 seconds, which are  67,+92 samples from the R-peak.
For the case of MSP data per one subject, 4 ⇥ 32 feature (Red, Yellow, IR, IY and 32
channels) vectors were collected. Two features (R+Y) were used for authentication method by
linearly combining. Thus, for each subject, MSP feature matrix transformed into one vector
with 64 lengths.
Totally, 111 subjects participated for measuring the data. After pre-process step, we divided
a data set into ’Experiment’ and ’Public’. The ’Experiment’ set which is composed with the 63
subjects who have both ECG and MSP features. The other, ’Public’, data set is composed with
the 39 subjects have only ECG pulses and 9 subjects have only MSP features. The ’Public’ data
set was used for AdaBoost training.
2.2.2 Performance Evaluation
For evaluating the performance, we used EER,PD1, and PD0.1. EER can be obtained by
the finding the point where FRR = FAR := EER. PD1 and PD0.1 are detection probability
at FAR is same as 1% and 0.1% respectively. Since the performance evaluation should be done
under fixed FAR value, we assume that by setting the fixed threshold is means fixed FAR value.
Thus, in under fixed threshold which is under same situation, the better detection probability is
the better performance. Also FRR0 means FRR value at FAR equals to 0 value which means
relatively hard thresholding situation.
2.2.3 Distance Normalization.
Our proposed authentication system is based on the Euclidean distance between ’Enrolled’
and ’Authenticate’ features. However, since the range of ECG pulses and MSP features are
di↵erent, the distance normalization was necessary for using the same classifier. Max distance
normalization was used by computing all the distances between subjects.
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2.2.4 Method Description
1. Thresholding (TH) based on distance between enrolled and 1 single feature or pulse then
simple thresholding with given threshold.
2. Averaging (AVG) based on distance between enrolled and averaged of more than 2 fea-
tures or pulses then simple thresholding with given threshold.
3. Majority Voting (MV) based on distance between enrolled and more than 2 features or
pulses each then classify with majority voting that composed of simple thresholdings with
given threshold.
4. Ada.MV based on distance between enrolled and more than 2 pulses and feature each then
classify with one single classifier which is weighted sum of classifier. In this exp, 4 classifier
was used (3 ECG pulses and 1 MSP feature).
5. Ada.AVG based on distance between enrolled and averaged of more than 2 pulses and
feature then classify with one single classifier which is weighted sum of classifier. In this
exp, 2 classifier was used (averaging of 3 ECG pulses and 1 MSP feature).
2.3 Results
2.3.1 Uni-Modal Authentication
Table 2.1: Performance results for all experiments about uni-modal authentication
ECG Only MSP Only
Method
#Feature
vectors
EER PD0.1 FRR0 Method
#Feature
vectors
EER PD0.1 FRR0
TH 1 1.7 47.0 3.42 TH 1 1.2 90.8 3.33
AVG
2 1.3 95.4 9.23
AVG
2 1.2 90.8 3.10
3 1.0 97.3 4.76 3 1.2 93.3 3.10
MV
2 1.8 87.6 29.1
MV
2 1.2 95.1 2.99
3 1.8 87.6 29.1 3 1.2 93.8 3.10
Ada.MV
2 1.8 87.6 29.1
Ada.MV
2 1.2 95.1 2.99
3 1.7 87.2 28.9 3 1.2 95.1 2.99
Table. 2.3.1 is the result of ROC curve for uni-modal authentication comparison. The best
performance was yielded by using averaged 3 ECG pulses case. That method was even better
than using majority voting or adaboost based majority voting. Note that here, under extremely
low FAR case, using MSP feature was better than ECG pulses overall.
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2.3.2 Multi-Modal Authentication
Table 2.2: Performance results for all experiments about multi-modal authentication versus
proposed methods
#Feature
vectors
MV Ada.MV Ada.AVG
EER PD0.1 FRR0 EER PD0.1 FRR0 EER PD0.1 FRR0
1,1 0.5 44.1 2.91 0.1 99.86 4.13 0.1 99.86 4.13
2,2 0.5 94.9 2.86 0.1 99.85 2.99 0.1 99.99 0.61
3,3 0.5 99.3 2.75 0.1 99.80 2.94 0.1 1.00 0.03
Tabel 2.2 summarizes all experiment results for multi-modal authentication. By simply com-
bining two modality with majority voting, we achieved far better results than using uni-modal
based authentication. Furthermore, by using adaboost to performance enhancing, it showed
that was e↵ective way. And also, it is observed that the best performance was adaboost with 3
features and pulses each (0.03%,FRR0)
2.4 Discussion
In this chapter, we investigated the ways of combining two modality, ECG and MSP. We
showed that our final proposed methods (Ada.AVG) yielded the best result. It is far better
than other uni-modal based authentication. By observing the performance di↵erence between
averaging 3 pulses of ECG and combining 3 pulses of ECG and 3 MSP feature by majority
voting method, One more interesting point was averaging e↵ect was more stronger than we
expected. Furthermore, since this Adaboost coe cients are trained by public data only (not
including the test data), it means that we may can find an appropriate weight distribution
between ECG modality and MSP modality.
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Figure 2.4: Potentially useful observation:threshold determination.
Finally, with this proposed combination methods, we showed powerful performance while
overcoming given constrained comes from using wearable devices as following: knowledge limi-
tation by Adaboost training with only public data set, low computing power by using ECG and
MSP in the shape of 1-dimensional signal, and with relatively high performance.
As a future work, we aim to investigate the threshold determination. It is commonly known
that determining appropriate thresholds without any other dataset except the user informa-
tion is challenging problem. Based on interesting observation in Figure 2.4, it is observed that
performance with experiment data set (63 subjects) on the threshold which is determined by
minimizing the error on public data set (9 subjects) showed appropriate results. That perfor-
mance has only 0.001 di↵erence with optimal EER point of experiment data set.
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CHAPTER III
Authentication Scheme by Using Protected
User Template
3.1 Background and Related Works
3.1.1 Cancelable Biometrics
Biometrics is a convenient and powerful security tool, but one of the drawbacks is its irrevo-
cability. If one password is compromised, this password can be immediately canceled and then
a new password can be generated and used. However, once biometrics is compromised, it can
not be canceled and re-used. Biometrics can not be changed forever.
Jain et al. emphasized strengthening the security of biometric system in [1]. Bolle et al.
proposed the concept of cancelable biometrics for protecting user-specific features [50]. Maltoni
et al. summarizes four criteria that cancelable biometrics must satisfy as follows [51,52]:
1. E ciency: cancelable biometrics should not deteriorate recognition performance.
2. Re-usability: there should be straightforward revocation and reissue procedures in the
event of compromise.
3. Diversity: the same cancelable template should not be used in two di↵erent applications.
4. Non-invertibility: the recovery of the original biometric template from cancelable biomet-
rics should be prevented.
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There have been several works on cancelable biometrics for fingerprint [53, 54], face [55, 56]
and iris [57]. Cancelable multimodal biometrics have also been proposed and investigated re-
cently [58,59]. These cancelable biometrics works are usually based on Johnson-Lindenstrauss(JL)
lemma [60] or compressive sensing (CS) [8]. They both showed that the distance between two
signals can be approximately preserved before and after random projections of them if the
random projection matrix is properly designed. Thus, randomly projected biometric signals or
features can be used for authentication or identification. Cancelable face biometrics was inves-
tigated based on JL lemma [52, 61]. Other works for cancelable biometrics were based on CS
theory for iris [57]. There has been some works on cancelable biometrics using BioHash for
face [56]. For more comprehensive reviews on cancelable biometrics and cancelable multimodal
biometrics, we refer readers to [62–64].
Recently, cancelable ECG biometrics have been investigated based on BioHash [65] and CS
theory [12,66]. It has been shown that highly compressed ECG yielded reasonable authentication
performance [12,66]. Applications of CS theory for ECG have been investigated for compression
or classification [67,68].
Unfortunately, it has been observed that protecting biometrics information comes with the
price of lowering authentication or identification performance [69, 70]. Moreover, compressed
biometric signals may preserve the distance between signals well based on JL lemma or CS
theory, but the usual choice for distance metric for compressed biometric signals is Euclidean
distance or its variant, which may be sub-optimal. Originally, CS theory has been developed
to recover the original signal from compressed samples [8]. Therefore, it is critical to check the
method based on CS theory has non-invertibility. There has been no prior work on cancelable
ECG biometrics that deals with the issue of performance degradation due to cancelable schemes,
near-optimal distance metric for compressed samples, and validation for cancelable biometrics
criteria altogether.
3.1.2 Compressive sensing and restricted isometry property
Compressive sampling (CS) theory models that the measurement y 2 RL for the original
signal x 2 RK is
y =  x (III.1)
where   is an L⇥K sensing matrix. The matrix   satisfies restricted isometry property (RIP)
of order P if there exists a constant   2 (0, 1) such that
(1   ) kxk22  k xk22  (1 +  ) kxk22 (III.2)
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holds for all x 2 ⌃P where the set ⌃P is all P -sparse signals such that
⌃P = {x 2 RK : kxk0  P}.
The RIP condition implies that some matrices with very small   can approximately preserve
the l2 norm of a signal. Examples are Gaussian random matrix and modified Bernoulli ran-
dom matrix [8]. This condition also implies that the distance between two P -sparse signals is
approximately preserved after applying   to these signals.
The CS theory also provided a way of reconstruct the original signal from the measurement
using a computationally e cient l1 minimization as follows [8]:
min
x˜2RK
kx˜kl1 s.t.  x˜ = y. (III.3)
It has been shown that the recovery in (III.3) is exact for P -sparse signals and is reasonably
good for non P -sparse signals with the measurement size L that is larger than a certain number,
but is much smaller than K [71, 72].
3.1.3 Signal processing with compressive measurement
The conventional CS theory focused on estimation problems in signal processing [71, 72].
The CS theory has been extended to other signal processing problems such as filtering and
signal detection [9, 10]. We review the signal detection in CS domain.
Davenport et al. proposed a hypothesis testing [10]:8<:H0 :  nH1 :   (x+ n) (III.4)
where x 2 RK is a known signal, n ⇠ N(0, 2IK) 2 RK is an i.i.d. Gaussian noise and   is a
random matrix. Then, the probability density functions for the hypothesis testing (III.4) can
be derived as follows:
f0(y) =
exp
  12yT ( 2  T ) 1y 
| 2  T |1/2 (2⇡)L/2
f1(y) =
exp
  12(y    x)T ( 2  T ) 1(y    x) 
| 2  T |1/2 (2⇡)L/2
where T is a transpose of a matrix and | · | is a matrix determinant.
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The optimal Neyman-Pearson(NP) detector for the hypothesis testing (III.4) is a likelihood
ratio test as follows:
⇤(y) =
f1(y)
f0(y)
H1
?
H0
⌘
where ⌘ is a threshold. By taking logarithm, the final detector in CS domain can be obtained:
yT (  T ) 1 x
H1
?
H0
 2log(⌘) +
1
2
xT T (  T ) 1 x :=  .
One interesting result in signal detection in CS domain is that Detection in CS domain yielded
much better performance than detection in signal domain after CS reconstruction with very
small measurement size [10], which can be potentially useful for cancelable biometrics.
3.2 Methods
3.2.1 Cancelable ECG biometrics using composite hypothesis testing with
compressive measurement
Storing the enrolled ECG template t in (II.4) is necessary in conventional ECG based user
authentication, but once compromised, the same template can not be revoked and re-used.
Inspired by [10], here we propose a new detector with compressive sensing measurement based
on the conjecture that this new detector does have reasonably good authentication performance
while does not have enough measurements for good signal recovery.
The compressive measurement for ECG can be defined as follows:
y = Hf ⇡ H(x+ n) (III.5)
where n ⇠ N(0,CK), CK is a K ⇥K covariance matrix, and H is a modified Bernoulli random
matrix with the size of L⇥K with the element of either 1/pK or  1/pK with probability 0.5.
We chose this particular random matrix because this random matrix H only requires L(K   1)
summations, L subtractions, and L devisions as well as a small storage of LK bits. These prop-
erties of H can potentially be appropriate for low cost wearable bands with limited computing
power and memory.
We formulated a composite hypothesis test as follows:8<:H0 : µ = µ0 :=HxH1 : µ 6= µ0 (III.6)
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where their probability density functions are
f0(y) =
exp
  12(y   µ0)T ( 2HCKHT ) 1(y   µ0) 
| 2HCKHT |1/2 (2⇡)L/2
,
f1(y;µ) =
exp
  12(y   µ)T ( 2HCKHT ) 1(y   µ) 
| 2HCKHT |1/2 (2⇡)L/2
,
respectively. The nearly-optimal GLRT detector is
⇤(y) =
maxµ 6=µ0 f1(y;µ)
f0(y)
=
f1(y; µˆML)
f0(y)
H1
?
H0
  (III.7)
where µˆML is the maximum likelihood estimator using f1(y;µ). In this case, µˆML is the sample
y so that the numerator of (III.7) becomes a constant. Further simplification of (III.7) leads to
(y   µ0)T (HCKHT ) 1(y   µ0)
H1
?
H0
 0 (III.8)
where  0 determines the trade-o↵ between detection probability and false alarm probability.
The original randomly projected ECG signal µ0 = Hx is usually not available. However,
for the case where a low noise user template t and a single ECG pulse input s are available,
it is reasonable to assume that Hx ⇡ Ht. By using a ‘plug-in’ approach, the proposed GLRT
detector becomes
(Hs Ht)T (HCKHT ) 1(Hs Ht)
H1
?
H0
 0 (III.9)
The noise covariance matrix CK can be estimated from the data. However, for simplicity, in
this paper we further simplified this by assuming i.i.d. Gaussian noise n so that the proposed
GLRT detector becomes
(Hs Ht)T (HHT ) 1(Hs Ht) ?  00. (III.10)
where  00 is a threshold.
Note that (Ht) and H will be stored for authentication so that the user template t will be
protected unless both (Ht) and H are compromised and the original signal can be recovered
from them. We will investigate the possibility of recovering the original user template from (Ht)
and H in the simulation.
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3.2.2 Performance boost trick I: Guided filtering in CS domain
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Figure 3.1: Examples of GF results with di↵erent guide signals (user template, the proposed
irreversible guide signal, and flat signal) and their zoomed plots.
It is well known that the performance degradation in cancelable biometrics is inevitable [69,
70]. Therefore, using performance boost tricks for cancelable biometrics is desirable.
Guided image filter (GF) was originally proposed in computer vision and has yielded excel-
lent performance in various applications such as denoising, artifact removal and upsampling [73].
Recently, Chun proposed to use a 1D GF for ECG authentication to yield improved perfor-
mance [13]. This user template guided filter utilized the enrolled ECG template t as a guide
signal to denoise the single pulse ECG input signal s. Since GF is essentially the local a ne
fitting of a guide image (or signal in 1D) to a noisy image (or signal) within moving local win-
dows, this operation requires very low computation complexity O(1) [73]. We denote this GF
procedure as:
sˆ = GF (s; t). (III.11)
Then t and sˆ are used for authentication instead of t and s.
Unfortunately, user template guided filtering for ECG authentication [13] can not be used
in cancelable ECG authentication schemes since it requires storing the original user template t.
In here, we propose a method to use this user template GF for cancelable biometrics.
Here are a few observations on the user template GF for ECG based authentication as also
shown in Fig. 3.1:
1. When using GF with a flat signal, good denoising results were obtained for P and T waves.
2. Having a good guide signal for denoising QRS complex is critical for good performance.
3. A scaled version of a guide signal still yields good denoising results.
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Figure 3.2: Steps for generating an irreversible guide signal from ECG template: cropping,
padding, and random scaling.
Based on them, we propose a guide construction method, called irreversible guide signal for
GF, to process the original ECG template t using a couple of consecutive irreversible operations
such as cropping P / W waves and random scaling with unknown scaling factor as illustrated
in Fig. 3.2. The resulting signal, tir, can be stored and used as an irreversible guide signal:
sˆ = GF (s; tir). (III.12)
It is expected that
GF (s; tir) ⇡ GF (s; t)
as demonstrated in Fig. 3.1. Recovering tir from t is infeasible due to two irreversible operators
used to create tir. Note that the scaling factor should not be stored.
3.2.3 Performance boost trick II: T-wave shift in CS domain
GLRT based ECG authentication method using T-wave circular shift model was proposed to
improve the authentication performance for the case of having unknown heart rate variation [14].
This method also requires to use the original ECG template t to find the minimum distance
between the template t and T-wave shifted ECG input s with unknown shift value. In here, we
propose a new T-wave shift model to use it in CS domain.
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We first modeled the input signal s to be separated into the PQRS segment sF and T wave
segment sS as also used in [14]. Then, the T wave can be modeled to be shifted for di↵erent
heart rate as follows: "
sF
 ↵sS
#
(III.13)
where  ↵ is a circular shift operator with an integer step size ↵. Then, we construct a composite
hypothesis testing to consider variable heart rate as follows:
H0 : y↵ ⇠ N(µ0,CK)
H1 : y↵ ⇠ N(µ,CK),µ 6= µ0
(III.14)
where µ, ↵ are unknown and
y↵ :=H
"
sF
 ↵sS
#
.
Then, we derived a GLRT detector with T wave shift model as follows:
max
µ 6=µ0,↵
exp
  12(y↵   µ)T (HCKHT ) 1(y↵   µ) 
max
↵
exp
  12(y↵   µ0)T (HCKHT ) 1(y↵   µ0)  . (III.15)
For the unknown µ0, a ‘plug-in’ approach can be used to replace it by Ht. Since the numerator
of (III.15) becomes 1 for the maximum likelihood estimator for µ, the GLRT detector can be
simplified as follows:
min
↵
n
(y↵    )T (HCKHT ) 1 (y↵    )
o H1
?
H0
  (III.16)
where   = Ht and   is a threshold.
Equation (III.16) is computationally expensive due to brute-force search for ↵. We derived
an equivalent operation for (III.16) using matrix-vector form to speed up computation as follows:
minD
 
(H  X)T (HCKHT ) 1(H  X)
 H1
?
H0
  (III.17)
where X =
h
· · ·   · · ·
i
2 RL⇥K0 , K 0 is the length of the T wave segment (sS), D is an
operator to extract diagonal elements to form a vector, and
  =
"
sF · · · sF
 1sS · · ·  K0sS
#
2 RK⇥K0 .
Note that K 0 is about the half of K. This result implies that since H is a RIP operator to
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approximately preserve the distance between two signals, the comparison that has been done
in signal domain for T wave shift model can be approximately done in CS domain.
Figure 3.3: Schematic diagram for the summary of enrollment and authentication procedures.
3.2.4 Cancelability criteria evaluation
Cancelable biometrics methods should be evaluated in terms of di↵erent aspects. Here we
investigated our proposed GLRTmethod (III.10) for cancelable ECG biometrics. to validate that
the proposed method satisfies all cancelable biometrics criteria that we discussed in [11,61,74].
E ciency Our proposed GLRT method is based on the CS theory and signal processing detec-
tion theory in CS measurement with appropriate random matrix H. Therefore, our detector
will be e↵ective in CS domain. In addition, two performance boost tricks in CS domain will
help having e cient authentication. Simulation results will also support this aspect of our
proposed methods.
Re-usability Our proposed method has straightforward revocation and reissue procedures.
Once compromised, a new random matrixH will be generated and through the new enrollment
step, new user template t will be obtained. Both H and Ht will be stored and re-used, but t
will be discarded.
Diversity In two di↵erent applications, two random matrices H’s can be generated. However,
the probability that these two random matrices are the same will be almost 0. For example,
our simulation used a random matrix H with the size of 32⇥ 320. Then, the probability that
two random matrices are the same is (1/2)32⇥320 ⇡ 0.
Non-invertibility Cancelable ECG template must be obtained using non-invertible transfor-
mation to prevent the recovery of biometric data from secure template. In CS theory, the
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original signal can be recovered with a random matrix H if both H and Ht are available and
the size of the compressive sensing measurement is large enough.
We conjecture that our GLRT detector in CS domain requires much smaller amount of samples
than the CS recovery does for good reconstruction. We will extensively investigate this issue
with simulations in Section 3.3.5 for the worst case (Considered as one of the strongest attack
by the Simoens et al. [75] ): compromised H and Ht.
Note that a random matrix H can be securely stored and used using hardwares such as smart
card. If there is no H available, then our proposed scheme is simply non-invertible.
3.3 Simulation Results
We investigated our proposed methods of cancelable ECG biometrics detector using GLRT
(III.10), performance boost tricks in CS domain such as user template GF (III.11), (III.12)
and T wave shift model (III.17) with a few public ECG databases. MATLAB was used for all
implementations (The Mathwork, Inc., MA, USA). Fig. 3.3 illustrates enrollment and authen-
tication procedures of our proposed methods. All the details will be described in the following
sub-sections.
3.3.1 Public ECG databases and data normalization
Figure 3.4: Data normalization across di↵erent ECG databases. Top and bottom figures show
histograms of three public ECG databases for the amplitude of ECG signals before and after
data normalization, respectively.
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Three public ECG databases from the PhysioNet were combined and used in simulations [17]
including subjects with normal heart condition as well as arrhythmia. The ECG-ID database
consists of ECG data from 89 healthy subjects with recordings from the same or di↵erent
days [18]. Each raw ECG record was acquired for about 20 seconds with the 500 Hz sampling
rate, 12-bit resolution. The ECG-ID database provides pre-processed ECG signals for baseline
draft, power-line noise, and high-frequency noise. The MIT-BIH Normal Sinus Rhythm database
contains ECG data from 18 healthy subjects for about one day (24 hours) with 128 Hz sampling
rate [16]. Five records were extracted per subject data. Lastly, ECG data from 40 subjects with
arrhythmia in the MIT-BIH Arrhythmia database were used in our simulation. These consist
of 48 half-hour excerpts of two-channel ambulatory with 360 Hz sampling rate, 11-bit resolu-
tion. Five records were extracted per subject data. ECG signals from both MIT-BIH Normal
Sinus Rhythm and MIT-BIH Arrhythmia databases were resampled with 500 Hz sampling rate,
which is the same as ECG signals in ECG-ID. Since three public ECG databases used di↵erent
sensors with di↵erent sensitivity, all three databases were normalized according to their am-
plitude histograms as shown in Fig. 3.4. Before data normalization, amplitude histograms of
di↵erent databases were not matched well, but after normalizing the maximum amplitude of
each database, amplitude histograms were now matched approximately.
3.3.2 Data pre-processing
Two records per subject from three public ECG databases were used in our simulations.
Each record was processed using Pan-Tompkins method for R-peak detection [76]. Then, each
ECG record was segmented with the length of 320 samples (0.64 second), which are -134,+185
samples from the R-peak covering all P-QRS-T fragment. From selected 12 ECG pulses, an
average ECG template was generated. One record was used for ECG template generation and
the other record was used for user authentication test with cross validation. Compressive sensing
random matrix for each person was generated where the numbers of projected samples are 32,
96, 160, respectively. We denote these cases as ‘compressed to 10%, 30%, 50%, respectively.
For irreversible guide signal generation, QRS complex part was extracted from from 0.218s
to 0.342s among 0.64s for each ECG pulse. Then, other parts of the extracted QRS complex
(0s - 0.218s, 0.342s - 0.64s) were padded with values to ensure the continuity of the resulting
signal. Then, finally, a random number was chosen from [0.5, 0.8] and then was multiplied to
the padded QRS complex to yield an irreversible guide signal.
For the performance evaluation, we adopt AUC, PD1 and EER where AUC can be obtained
by numerical integration of ROC curve, PD1 is detection probability at FAR = 1%, ROC curve
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is a plot of false alarm probability PF or FAR vs. detection probability PD, and EER is a point
where FRR = FAR =: EER.
3.3.3 Proposed GLRT based cancelable ECG biometrics
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Figure 3.5: Examples of compressed samples from ECG signals with di↵erent compression ratio.
Fig. 3.5 illustrates examples of compressed samples from a ECG signal (shown in the top-
left figure of Fig. 3.5) with di↵erent compression ratio. Other compressed signals in Fig. 3.5 did
not shown any visually meaningful interpretation since they are randomly projected. Table 3.1
presents the results of authentication performance for Conventional, not projected (Euclidean
distance in signal domain, baseline), Conventional, compressed to 10% (Euclidean distance in
CS domain) and GLRT, compressed to 10% (proposed GLRT in CS domain). Note that the
proposed GLRT with compressed to 10% yielded comparable results to the baseline. However,
mild performance degradation was observed in cancelable biometrics methods. Proposed GLRT
method yielded better PD1 and EER than conventional method with the same measurement
(compressed to 10%) even though performance gap was marginal.
3.3.4 Proposed performance boost tricks in CS domain
Table 3.2 summarizes the results of the two proposed performance boost tricks for GLRT
based cancelable ECG biometrics. When using GF with user template guide signal, significant
performance increase was observed in terms of all performance metrics over GLRT, compressed
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Table 3.1: Performance summary for GLRT. Cancelable biometrics yielded comparable results
to conventional ECG biometrics.
Method PD1 (%) AUC EER (%)
Conventional, not projected 94.4 0.996 3.1
Conventional, compressed to 10 % 92.0 0.995 3.6
GLRT, compressed to 10 % 92.2 0.995 3.5
to 10%. Using GF enabled the proposed cancelable ECG biometrics method to yield better per-
formance than baseline (Euclidean in signal domain). GF with irreversible guide signal yielded
comparable performance to GF with original user template. T-wave model in CS domain yielded
better EER than the original GLRT, but yielded worse PD1 than that. Finally, using both tricks
yielded significantly improved performance over GLRT, compressed to 10% as well as baseline
in signal domain.
3.3.5 Cancelable biometrics: e ciency and non-invertibility
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 demonstrated that the proposed cancelable biometrics methods are ef-
ficient so that they satisfy one of the cancelable biometrics criteria since the authentication
performance of them is comparable to or better than the baseline using user template.
For non-invertibility of cancelable biometrics criteria, firstly, CS recoveries from compressed
ECG samples with di↵erent compression ratios were performed. Fig. 3.6 illustrates examples of
recovered ECG signals from the compressed samples with 50%, 30% and 10%. For compressed
to 50%, recovered ECG signal is visually similar to the original ECG pulse. For compressed
to 30%, recovered signal still contains part of the shapes of the original signal. However, some
details such as P wave, S wave are contaminated by artifacts. For compressed to 10%, almost
no details were recovered. Therefore, with the compressed to 10% cancelable ECG samples, we
were able to achieve good performance as shown in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, but we were not able to
recover the original signal if the random matrix H and the secure user template Ht are given.
Table 3.2: Performance summary for performance boost tricks. Proposed tricks significantly
improved authentication over baseline.
Method PD1 (%) AUC EER (%)
GLRT, 10 % 92.2 0.995 3.5
GLRT, 10 %, GF 95.9 0.996 3.0
GLRT, 10 %, GF irreversible 96.1 0.996 2.9
GLRT, 10 %, T-wave 91.6 0.996 3.3
GLRT, 10 %, GF irreversible, T-wave 97.1 0.998 1.9
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Figure 3.6: Examples of CS recovery results of ECG signals from samples with di↵erent com-
pression ratios (50%, 30% and 10%).
We further simulated cases to examine that this recovered ECG data from compressed to
10% samples can be potentially used for authentication. One case is where an imposter stole the
cancelable ECG temple Ht with the random matrix H, recovered ECG signal using CS recovery,
and then tried to intrude into the authentication system having the same random matrix H
(called C1). The other case is almost the same as C1, but now the imposter tried to intrude
into the system having di↵erent random matrix (H 0) that was re-generated after revocation and
having a new secure user template (called C2). We also simulated a baseline case where the true
user is using this new system with re-generated random matrix H 0 as well as re-issued secure
template H 0t (called P).
Fig. 3.7 shows plots of performance metrics (EER, PD1) versus the number of compressed
Table 3.3: Performance table for non-invertibility evaluation
Compressed to Cases PD1 (%) AUC EER (%)
10 %
P 93.5 0.996 2.8
C1 19.1 0.863 22.0
C2 17.7 0.880 20.6
30 %
P 95.7 0.997 2.1
C1 74.9 0.985 6.3
C2 54.0 0.965 10.4
50 %
P 96.2 0.997 2.0
C1 92.7 0.996 2.6
C2 91.2 0.996 3.0
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Figure 3.7: Performance plots of EER (top) and PD1 (bottom) versus number of compressed
samples. For imposter cases with small number of samples, low authentication performances
were achieved.
samples. For very small number of compressed samples such as 10 or 20 samples, the proposed
GLRT based detector yielded good performance. However, for more than 30% compression
ratio, the imposters were able to achieve good authentication with recovered ECG signal from
a random matrix as well as secure ECG template. Table 3.3 also shows quantitatively that the
imposters with recovered signal from compressed to 10% secure template and random matrix
was not able to achieve good authentication performance.
3.4 Discussion
In this article, we proposed cancelable ECG biometrics methods using composite hypothesis
testing in CS domain. We showed that these proposed methods yielded comparable to or better
than the baseline method of using original ECG user template with the small amount of sam-
ples (10% in simulations) that were not enough for recovering the original signal. The proposed
detectors in CS domain seem to use samples more e ciently than detectors in signal domain
using recovered signals from CS measurements. This is an important property for cancelable bio-
metrics with e ciency and non-invertibility. Even though the detection probability of imposter
cases were about 19.1 and 17.7 % for non-invertibility evaluation, the system can be protected
well against these imposters using a scheme similar to ‘password lock’ that blocks an incoming
user with several consecutive authentication fails. Therefore, the argument for non-invertibility
of the proposed methods is still valid.
We also proposed two performance boost tricks that can be used in CS domain. Note that
user template guided filtering for ECG biometrics has shown that GF was useful to improve the
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performance of simple algorithms such as Euclidean metric or dynamic time warping (DTW),
but was not improving performance for more sophisticated algorithms such as principle com-
ponent (PCA) based authentication, which already is robust to noise [13]. We expect that the
proposed tricks can be useful for the cases with limited access to others’ ECG data or with
limited computation power and memory (e.g., low cost wearable band).
Having the irreversible guide signal for GF may potentially decrease the security level of
cancelable biometrics. However, note that GF is not the only method to increase the security
level of the system. For systems that require strong security level, one may consider using
multimodal biometrics including our proposed ECG biometrics without GF. Locally di↵erent
random scaling can potentially increase the security level of irreversible guide signal. Further
studies may be interesting for this issue.
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CHAPTER IV
Conclusion
In this study, we investigated an ability of combining ECG and MSP as a biometrics in-
gredients. By training Adaboost algorithm on each thresholds with 9 subjects of public data,
outperform authentication results (which are 99.7% PD0.1 and 0.2 % EER) was yielded with 63
subjects. Further investigation for the method of fusion will be performed in various way such
as feature level or score level not only decision level fusion.
We proposed a cancelable ECG biometric using compressive sensing based composite hy-
pothesis testing (GLRT) and investigated its cancelable biometrics properties. We further inves-
tigated a couple of tricks to compensate for performance degradation due to proposed cancelable
biometric scheme. Our proposed method yielded up to 97.1% PD1 and 1.9% EER with the in-
tegrated public ECG database with 147 subjects. As a future works, proposed method can be
extended by investigation of cancelability of MSP biometrics and it further includes the fusion
for cancelable multi-modal biometrics combined of ECG and MSP.
This study may contribute for development a powerful multi-modal biometrics based authen-
tication for wearable devices, while they are computationally low cost, preventing the directing
and indirecting spoofing, and potentially simple to implement.
29
References
[1] A. K. Jain, A. Ross, and S. Pankanti, “Biometrics: a tool for information security,” IEEE
transactions on information forensics and security, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 125–143, 2006. v, 2,
13
[2] Y. C. Jo, H. N. Kim, J. H. Kang, H. K. Hong, Y. S. Choi, S. W. Jung, and S. P. Kim,
“Novel wearable-type biometric devices based on skin tissue optics with multispectral led–
photodiode matrix,” Japanese Journal of Applied Physics, vol. 56, no. 4S, pp. 04CM01,
2017. v, 6
[3] A. K. Jain, A. Ross, and S. Prabhakar, “An Introduction to Biometric Recognition,” IEEE
Transactions on Circuits and Systems for Video Technology, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 4–20, Jan.
2004. 1
[4] “International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Doc 9303 Machine Readable Travel
Documents Part 1,” Accessed: 2016-04-20. 2
[5] A. Ross and A. K. Jain, “Multimodal biometrics: An overview,” in Signal Processing
Conference, 2004 12th European. IEEE, 2004, pp. 1221–1224. 2
[6] S. Sarhan, S. Alhassan, and S. Elmougy, “Multimodal biometric systems: A comparative
study,” Arabian Journal for Science and Engineering, vol. 42, no. 2, pp. 443–457, 2017. 2,
7
30
REFERENCES
[7] J. A. Unar, W. C. Seng, and A. Abbasi, “A review of biometric technology along with
trends and prospects,” Pattern recognition, vol. 47, no. 8, pp. 2673–2688, 2014. 2
[8] E. J. Cande`s, J. Romberg, and T. Tao, “Robust uncertainty principles: Exact signal re-
construction from highly incomplete frequency information,” IEEE Transactions on infor-
mation theory, vol. 52, no. 2, pp. 489–509, 2006. 2, 14, 15
[9] J. Haupt and R. Nowak, “Compressive sampling for signal detection,” in Acoustics, Speech
and Signal Processing, 2007. ICASSP 2007. IEEE International Conference on. IEEE,
2007, vol. 3, pp. III–1509. 2, 15
[10] M. A. Davenport, P. T. Boufounos, M. B. Wakin, and R. G. Baraniuk, “Signal processing
with compressive measurements,” IEEE Journal of Selected Topics in Signal Processing,
vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 445–460, 2010. 2, 15, 16
[11] R. Belguechi, E. Cherrier, A. M. El, and C. Rosenberger, “Evaluation of cancelable bio-
metric systems: Application to finger-knuckle-prints,” in Hand-Based Biometrics (ICHB),
2011 International Conference on. IEEE, 2011, pp. 1–6. 3, 21
[12] C. M. Fira, L. Goras, C. Barabasa, and N. Cleju, “ECG compressed sensing based on clas-
sification in compressed space and specified dictionaries,” in Signal Processing Conference,
2011 19th European. IEEE, 2011, pp. 1573–1577. 3, 14
[13] S. Y. Chun, “Single pulse ECG-based small scale user authentication using guided filtering,”
in Biometrics (ICB), 2016 International Conference on. IEEE, 2016, pp. 1–7. 3, 7, 18, 28
[14] S. Y. Chun, “Small scale single pulse ECG-based authentication using glrt that considers
t wave shift and adaptive template update with prior information,” in Pattern Recognition
(ICPR), 2016 23rd International Conference on. IEEE, 2016, pp. 3043–3048. 3, 7, 19, 20
[15] H. Kim, M. P. Nguyen, and S. Y. Chun, “Cancelable ECG biometrics using glrt and
performance improvement using guided filter with irreversible guide signal,” in Engineering
in Medicine and Biology Society (EMBC), 2017 39th Annual International Conference of
the IEEE. IEEE, 2017, pp. 454–457. 3
[16] G. B. Moody and R. G. Mark, “The impact of the mit-bih arrhythmia database,” IEEE
Engineering in Medicine and Biology Magazine, vol. 20, no. 3, pp. 45–50, 2001. 3, 23
[17] A. L. Goldberger, L. A. N. Amaral, L. Glass, J. M. Hausdor↵, P. Ch. Ivanov, R. G. Mark,
J. E. Mietus, C. K. Moody, G. B. Peng, H. E. Stanley, PhysioBank, PhysioToolkit, and
31
REFERENCES
PhysioNet, “Components of a New Research Resource for Complex Physiologic Signals.,”
Circulation, vol. 101, no. 23, pp. e215–e220, June 2000. 3, 23
[18] Lugovaya T. S., “Biometric human identification based on electrocardiogram.,” M.S. thesis,
Faculty of Computing Technologies and Informatics, Electrotechnical University ”LETI”,
Saint-Petersburg, Russian Federation, June 2005. 3, 5, 23
[19] S. A. Israel, J. M. Irvine, A. Cheng, M. D. Wiederhold, and B. K. Wiederhold, “ECG to
identify individuals,” Pattern Recognition, vol. 38, no. 1, pp. 133–142, Jan. 2005. 4
[20] J. M. Irvine, S. A. Israel, W. Todd S., and W. J. Worek, “eigenPulse: Robust human
identification from cardiovascular function,” Pattern Recognition, vol. 41, no. 11, pp. 3427–
3435, Nov. 2008. 4, 5
[21] F. Sufi, I. Khalil, and J. Hu, “ECG-Based Authentication,” in Handbook of Information and
Communication Security, Peter Stavroulakis and Mark Stamp, Eds., pp. 309–331. Springer
Berlin Heidelberg, 2010. 4
[22] W. Einthoven, “The Di↵erent Forms of the Human Electrocardiogram and Their Signifi-
cation,” The Lancet, vol. 179, no. 4622, pp. 853–861, Mar. 1912. 4
[23] R. Hoekema, G. J. Uijen, and A. van Oosterom, “Geometrical aspects of the interindividual
variability of multilead ECG recordings.,” IEEE Transactions on Biomedical Engineering,
vol. 48, no. 5, pp. 551–559, May 2001. 4
[24] L. Biel, O. Pettersson, L. Philipson, and P. Wide, “ECG analysis: a new approach in human
identification,” IEEE Transactions on Instrumentation and Measurement, vol. 50, no. 3,
pp. 808–812, June 2001. 5
[25] M. Kyoso and A. Uchiyama, “Development of an ECG identification system,” in Proceed-
ings of the 23rd Annual International Conference of the IEEE Engineering in Medicine
and Biology Society, Istanbul, 2001, pp. 3721–3723. 5
[26] Y. N. Singh and P. Gupta, “Biometrics Method for Human Identification Using Electrocar-
diogram,” in International Conference on Biometrics, M Tistarelli and M S Nixon, Eds.,
2009, pp. 1270–1279. 5
[27] B. Vuksanovic and M. Alhamdi, “Analysis of Human Electrocardiogram for Biometric
Recognition Using Analytic and AR Modeling Extracted Parameters,” International Jour-
nal of Biometrics and Bioinformatics, vol. 9-42, no. 3, pp. 25–25, 2015. 5
32
REFERENCES
[28] R. J. Martis, C. Chakraborty, and A. K. Ray, “Wavelet-based Machine Learning Techniques
for ECG Signal Analysis,” in Machine Learning in Healthcare Informatics, pp. 25–45.
Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Dec. 2013. 5
[29] T. W. Shen, W. J. Tompkins, and Y. H. Hu, “One-lead ECG for identity verification,” in
Proceedings of the 2nd Joint EMBS/BMES Conference. 2002, pp. 62–63, IEEE. 5
[30] N. Venkatesh and S. Jayaraman, “Human electrocardiogram for biometrics using DTW
and FLDA,” in 20th International Conference on Pattern Recognition (ICPR), Aug 2010,
pp. 3838–3841. 5
[31] P. Sung, Z. Syed, and J. Guttag, “Quantifying morphology changes in time series data with
skew,” in Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and
Signal Processing, Taipei, Mar. 2009, pp. 477–480. 5
[32] C. C. Chiu, C. M. Chuang, and C. Y. Hsu, “A Novel Personal Identity Verification Approach
Using a Discrete Wavelet Transform of the ECG Signal,” in Proceedings of International
Conference on Multimedia and Ubiquitous Engineering, 2008, pp. 201–206. 5
[33] G. Wu¨bbeler, M. Stavridis, Di. Kreiseler, R. D. Bousseljot, and C. Elster, “Verification
of humans using the electrocardiogram,” Pattern Recognition Letters, vol. 28, no. 10, pp.
1172–1175, July 2007. 5
[34] I. Odinaka, P. H. Lai, A. D. Kaplan, J. A. O’Sullivan, E. J. Sirevaag, and J. W. Rohrbaugh,
“ECG Biometric Recognition: A Comparative Analysis,” IEEE Transactions on Informa-
tion Forensics and Security, vol. 7, no. 6, pp. 1812–1824, Nov. 2012. 5, 6
[35] M. Merone, P. Soda, M. Sansone, and C. Sansone, “ECG databases for biometric systems:
A systematic review,” Expert Systems with Applications, vol. 67, pp. 189–202, 2017. 5
[36] E. Nemati, M. J. Deen, and T. Mondal, “A wireless wearable ECG sensor for long-term ap-
plications,” in IEEE Communications Magazine. McMaster University, Hamilton, Canada,
Jan. 2012, pp. 36–43. 5
[37] M. Elgendi, B. Eskofier, S. Dokos, and D. Abbott, “Revisiting QRS Detection Methodolo-
gies for Portable, Wearable, Battery-Operated, and Wireless ECG Systems,” PLoS ONE,
vol. 9, no. 1, pp. e84018–18, Jan. 2014. 5
[38] S. J. Kang, S. .Y Lee, H. I. Cho, and H. Park, “ECG Authentication System Design Based
on Signal Analysis in Mobile and Wearable Devices,” IEEE Signal Processing Letters, vol.
23, no. 6, pp. 805–808, 2016. 5
33
REFERENCES
[39] S. Yin, Y. Ma, Y. Liu, C. Bae, S. Kim, J. He, Y. Cao, and J. Seo, “Low-Power ECG Bio-
metric Authentication for Wearable Systems Featuring Sparse Memory Compression,” in
On-Device Intelligence Workshop at ICML International Conference on Machine Learning,
June 2016. 5
[40] S. Y. Chun, J. H. Kang, H. Kim, C. Lee, I. Oakley, and S. P. Kim, “ECG based user
authentication for wearable devices using short time Fourier transform,” in 2016 39th
International Conference on Telecommunications and Signal Processing, TSP 2016. Ulsan
National Institute of Science and Technology, Ulsan, South Korea, 2016, pp. 656–659, IEEE.
5
[41] Y. N. Singh, S. K. Singh, and P. Gupta, “Fusion of electrocardiogram with unobtrusive
biometrics: An e cient individual authentication system,” Pattern Recognition Letters,
vol. 33, no. 14, pp. 1932–1941, 2012. 5
[42] M. D. Bugdol and A. W. Mitas, “Multimodal biometric system combining ECG and sound
signals,” Pattern Recognition Letters, vol. 38, pp. 107–112, 2014. 5
[43] S. Zokaee and K. Faez, “Human identification based on ECG and palmprint,” International
Journal of Electrical and Computer Engineering, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 261, 2012. 5
[44] S. Luo and P. Johnston, “A review of electrocardiogram filtering,” Journal of electrocar-
diology, vol. 43, no. 6, pp. 486–496, 2010. 5
[45] Robert S Boyer and J Strother Moore, “Mjrty—a fast majority vote algorithm,” pp.
105–117, 1991. 7, 8
[46] Laurent Alonso and Edward M Reingold, “Analysis of boyer and moores mjrty algorithm,”
Information Processing Letters, vol. 113, no. 13, pp. 495–497, 2013. 7, 8
[47] Jerome Friedman, Trevor Hastie, and Robert Tibshirani, The elements of statistical learn-
ing, vol. 1, Springer series in statistics New York, 2001. 7, 8
[48] Vassilios Chatzis, Adrian G Bors, and Ioannis Pitas, “Multimodal decision-level fusion
for person authentication,” IEEE transactions on systems, man, and cybernetics-part a:
systems and humans, vol. 29, no. 6, pp. 674–680, 1999. 7
[49] Jiapu Pan andWillis J Tompkins, “A real-time qrs detection algorithm,” IEEE transactions
on biomedical engineering, , no. 3, pp. 230–236, 1985. 9
[50] R. M. Bolle, J. H. Connell, and N. K. Ratha, “Biometric perils and patches,” Pattern
Recognition, vol. 35, no. 12, pp. 2727–2738, 2002. 13
34
REFERENCES
[51] D. Maltoni, D. Maio, A. Jain, and S. Prabhakar, Handbook of fingerprint recognition,
Springer Science & Business Media, 2009. 13
[52] A. B. Teoh, A. Goh, and D. C. L. Ngo, “Random multispace quantization as an analytic
mechanism for biohashing of biometric and random identity inputs,” IEEE Transactions
on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence, vol. 28, no. 12, pp. 1892–1901, 2006. 13, 14
[53] J. Ratha, N.and Connell, R. M. Bolle, and S. Chikkerur, “Cancelable Biometrics: A Case
Study in Fingerprints,” vol. 4, pp. 370–373, 2006. 14
[54] A. Othman and A. Ross, “On mixing fingerprints,” IEEE Transactions on Information
Forensics and security, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 260–267, 2013. 14
[55] A. B. J. Teoh and C. T. Yuang, “Cancelable Biometrics Realization With Multispace
Random Projections,” IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics, Part B
(Cybernetics), vol. 37, no. 5, pp. 1096–1106, Sept. 2007. 14
[56] A. B. J. Teoh, Y. W. Kuan, and S. Lee, “Cancellable biometrics and annotations on
BioHash,” Pattern Recognition, vol. 41, no. 6, pp. 2034–2044, June 2008. 14
[57] J. K. Pillai, V. M. Patel, R. Chellappa, and N. K. Ratha, “Secure and robust iris recognition
using random projections and sparse representations,” IEEE Transactions on Pattern
Analysis and Machine Intelligence, vol. 33, no. 9, pp. 1877–1893, Sept. 2011. 14
[58] A. M. P. Canuto, F. Pintro, and J. C. Xavier-Junior, “Investigating fusion approaches in
multi-biometric cancellable recognition,” Expert Systems with Applications, vol. 40, no. 6,
pp. 1971–1980, 2013. 14
[59] H. Kaur and P. Khanna, “Biometric template protection using cancelable biometrics and
visual cryptography techniques,” Multimedia Tools and Applications, vol. 75, no. 23, pp.
16333–16361, 2016. 14
[60] W. B. Johnson and J. Lindenstrauss, “Extensions of lipschitz mappings into a hilbert
space,” Contemporary mathematics, vol. 26, no. 189-206, pp. 1, 1984. 14
[61] A. B. J. Teoh and C. T. Yuang, “Cancelable biometrics realization with multispace random
projections,” IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part B (Cybernetics),
vol. 37, no. 5, pp. 1096–1106, 2007. 14, 21
[62] C. Rathgeb and A. Uhl, “A survey on biometric cryptosystems and cancelable biometrics,”
EURASIP Journal on Information Security, vol. 2011, no. 1, pp. 3, 2011. 14
35
REFERENCES
[63] M. Gomez-Barrero, E. Maiorana, J. Galbally, P. Campisi, and J. Fierrez, “Multi-biometric
template protection based on homomorphic encryption,” Pattern Recognition, vol. 67, pp.
149–163, 2017. 14
[64] V. M. Patel, N. K. Ratha, and R. Chellappa, “Cancelable biometrics: A review,” IEEE
Signal Processing Magazine, vol. 32, no. 5, pp. 54–65, 2015. 14
[65] M. Dey, N. Dey, S. K. Mahata, S. Chakraborty, S. Acharjee, and A. Das, “Electrocar-
diogram Feature based Inter-human Biometric Authentication System,” vol. 2014, pp.
300–304, 2014. 14
[66] C. Camara, P. Peris-Lopez, and J. E. Tapiador, “Human identification using compressed
ECG signals,” Journal of medical systems, vol. 39, no. 11, pp. 1–10, 2015. 14
[67] D. Craven, B. McGinley, L. Kilmartin, and E. Glavin, M.and Jones, “Adaptive dictionary
reconstruction for compressed sensing of ECG signals,” IEEE journal of biomedical and
health informatics, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 645–654, 2017. 14
[68] S. L. Parkale, Y. V .and Nalbalwar, “Application of compressed sensing (CS) for ECG
signal compression: A review,” in Proceedings of the International Conference on Data
Engineering and Communication Technology. Springer, 2017, pp. 53–65. 14
[69] C. Rathgeb and A. Uhl, “A survey on biometric cryptosystems and cancelable biometrics,”
EURASIP Journal on Information Security, vol. 2011, no. 1, pp. 1–25, 2011. 14, 18
[70] S. Rane, Y. Wang, S. C. Draper, and P. Ishwar, “Secure biometrics: concepts, authentica-
tion architectures, and challenges,” IEEE Signal Processing Magazine, vol. 30, no. 5, pp.
51–64, 2013. 14, 18
[71] E. J. Cande`s and M. B. Wakin, “An introduction to compressive sampling,” IEEE signal
processing magazine, vol. 25, no. 2, pp. 21–30, 2008. 15
[72] D. L. Donoho, “Compressed sensing,” IEEE Transactions on information theory, vol. 52,
no. 4, pp. 1289–1306, 2006. 15
[73] K. He, J. Sun, and X. Tang, “Guided image filtering,” IEEE Transactions on Pattern
Analysis and Machine Intelligence, vol. 35, no. 6, pp. 1397–1409, June 2013. 18
[74] A. K. Jain, K. Nandakumar, and A. Nagar, “Biometric template security,” EURASIP
Journal on advances in signal processing, vol. 2008, pp. 113, 2008. 21
36
REFERENCES
[75] K. Simoens, J. Bringer, H. Chabanne, and S. Seys, “A framework for analyzing tem-
plate security and privacy in biometric authentication systems,” IEEE Transactions on
Information Forensics and Security, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 833–841, 2012. 22
[76] J. Pan and W. J. Tompkins, “A real-time QRS detection algorithm,” IEEE Transactions
on Biomedical Engineering, vol. 32, no. 3, pp. 230–236, Mar. 1985. 23
37
